Budapest’s “House of Terror”. It Sounds like a Carnival Ride, but it Isn’t, but in a Way it Actually Kind of Is.

So I’ve been spending some days on a very welcome break in Budapest. Most of it was a break, but not all, because I did end up visiting the House of Terror. Far from being some sort of fun fair exhibition, it’s a museum dedicated to the memory of the two ‘terror regimes’ that Hungary lived through during the 20th century. The museum showcases a bunch of exhibits dating back to the rule of the Arrow Cross Party as well as the era of communist rule, focusing in particular on the events of 1956.

I came away impressed by the design of the various museum rooms, which was very well done, very theatrical. The different spaces were designed almost like stage sets, and every part of the rooms was used to convey a certain message – the rooms themselves were the exhibits, as opposed to all those museums where exhibits are lined up on blank walls in otherwise non-descript and interchangeable rooms. To give an example, one of the rooms that dealt with the might of the Soviet Union (or something like that – these rooms’ messages tended to be opaque) had a wall to wall floor carpet map of the Soviet Union from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok (not available in the museum store, unfortunately). In addition to giant carpet maps, the lighting was also expertly done and there was music ominously droning to set the mood. In many ways, this museum *was* like a fun fair ghost town ride. Another example (and in fact an example of an actual ride) was the elevator from the first (US second) floor down to the basement.

This elevator ride is part of the exhibition. It makes the trip down two floors in maybe two minutes and during that time those in the elevator are subjected to an old man describing in detail how exactly the secret service would execute its victims – all before letting you out into the basement where they reconstructed the cells and the execution room to their 1950s state.

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I’ll acknowledge that perhaps I am not part of the intended audience, and I’ll gladly acknowledge that the Hungarian language was an obstacle here and there as not all the signs were translated. Still, my main criticism of this museum would be that it tries to tell the story about these challenging times in Hungarian history mostly through those theatrical devices and not at all through actually conveying factual information or placing exhibits and quotes into a context. The visitor comes away with a strong sense that a lot of terrible things happened, but without having learned very much about why those things happened, what brought them about, beyond the individual agency of the evil-doers. This sense is reinforced by one of the last areas in the museum, which identified what they call the ‘victimizers’ with names and photos. I am in no position to challenge this view of these people and their careers, and I’ll agree that structural and systematic factors are less readily displayed in a museum than a black-and-white photograph of a ‘victimizer’. Still, to pin all of communism’s failings on those people seems a little simplistic, and to refer to these regimes as ‘terror regimes’ does as well.

As a last note, I was intrigued to find out that the museum states the involvement of Viktor Orbán (Hungary’s current PM) in bringing this museum about. In Hungary as elsewhere, projects like these have been challenged by those who describe them as right-wing projects   rather than society-wide attempts to come to terms with unpleasant episodes in the nation’s history. This museum does little to counteract that notion, and it does not seem that the view of the communist past that this museum presents is one that all elements of Hungarian society would share.

The Economist Covers My Topic .. and Gets it Wrong!

One of the key things that I am interested in for my dissertation has been the ‘institutes of national memory’ – a number of similar organizations that exist across east and central Europe and that were founded during the 1990s (Poland in 1998 was the first) and 2000s (Slovakia in ’02, Czech Republic as late as ’07) to oversee the files of the former secret service and to facilitate public access to them. The institutes have other functions too, including but not limited to historical research and offering publications about the communist past to a wide audience. These institutes have been controversial, with detractors claiming that they are a right-wing project that paints an overly stark, black and white view of the communist past without acknowledging the differences between the Stalinist period of the 40s and 50s, on the one hand, and later, comparatively milder periods.

In recent months, controversy over the Czech ‘Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes‘ has reached unprecedented heights. While the conflict has caused considerable anguish to many of those involved, it’s been exceedingly fascinating for me to see the very topic of my dissertation as ‘breaking news’ in Czech media and as the subject of acrimonious discussion among political actors and public officials. I’ve met with and spoken to the majority of the key actors involved in this issue and seeing someone you talked to a day or so ago cited in the newspapers, commenting on the very issue you talked to them about, is kind of awesome. The conflict has also attracted international attention (although not nearly as much as when a few clueless people in the US did not know the difference between the Czech Republic and Chechnya). In fact, this topic has even warranted a post on the Economist’s Eastern Approaches blog. Unfortunately, while whoever wrote that blog post got some basics right, most of what they wrote is wrong. I most strongly disagree with the way the Czech Republic is described as a country that lags behind in terms of attempting to deal with the communist past through addressing the collaborators of the former secret service. There can be different opinions on the extent to which those attempts have been successful, but you can’t say the Czechs have not tried.

Nonetheless, The Economist notes that: “The relatively late creation of the ÚSTR 19 years after the fall of the communist regime is in stark contrast to how some other post-Communist states dealt with their past. The former East Germany, for example, allowed citizens to access security service archives in short order. The relative silence in then-Czechoslovakia’s immediate post-Communist years allowed people with ties to the former regime to gain influential positions in business and politics, some making a seamless transition from Marxist ideologue to crusading capitalist.”

Almost everything is wrong with this quote. First off, the comparison with Germany is off. To suggest that ‘East Germany’ did much of anything when it was in fact the West Germans who stipulated what would happen to the Stasi files directly in the Reunification Treaty. No other post-communist country had the benefit of an external actor, clean with respect to secret service collaboration, coming in to settle this matter.

Secondly, as compared to any other country in the post-communist world, the Czech Republic was the first and went the furthest when it comes to trying to remove former secret service personnel from the ranks of the civil service and other key offices. As early as 1991,  the Czechoslovakian Federal Assembly adopted the so-called ‘lustration law’ that banned former secret service informers as well as high-ranking communist party members from a wide range of public offices (though not elected offices). The law was grandfathered into Czech legislation in 1993, renewed in 1996 and again in 2001, and is in force to this day. To characterize the Czech approach to the former communist regime and its collaborators as ‘relative silence’ completely misses the mark. If there is a ‘stark contrast’, it is because the Czechs stood at the forefront of introducing legislation meant to address just that issue.

While it is true that many communists are still active in Czech politics today, it is also true that Communists have played a far, far larger role in politics elsewhere in the post-communist world. Slovakia, to stay close to home, has in its 20 years of independence, only ever had presidents that were formerly a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (and high-ranking members in some cases). The same is true for Romania between 1990 and today (well, 1947 and today, really). The Czech Republic stands out as a country were elite renewal at least in terms of politics has been extremely successful – especially given that roughly 1 in 5 Czech adults in 1990 were or had been a member of the Communist Party. So yeah, of course it is true that some communists made a ‘seamless transition from Marxist ideologue to crusading capitalist’ and became rich very quickly. That however is not so much because of the way the Czech Republic addressed its past, but rather in spite of it.

Weird Coalition Politics

So the current Czech government is a coalition government made up of ODS (the Civic Democrats), TOP ’09 (TOP stands for Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita, ie Tradition, Responsibility, and Prosperity), and a party called LIDEM. LIDEM is short for Liberal Democrats, but the word lidem also means ‘by the people’ or ‘for people’*. It’s clever.

LIDEM as a party did not exist in 2010 when there were elections. The people now in LIDEM came out of a party called Věci Veřejné (VV), or Public Affairs. This party joined ODS and TOP09 in the coalition but succombed to internal strife. It left the coalition, and suffered the breakaway of a number of MPs that remained in the coalition as LIDEM. The original coalition relied on the support of 118 MPs (out of 200), 24 of which were VV candidates. Of those 24, eight joined LIDEM and when they did, the coalition lost the support of 16 MPs, giving it only a very narrow 2-seat majority (102 out of 200).

This would give LIDEM a pretty nice bargaining position, one would think. However, their position in the coalition has been, in political science terms, downright weird. LIDEM’s leader, Karolína Peake, is vice-premier but has no actual policy portfolio. In December 2012, she was given the Ministry of Defence, but PM Nečas relieved her of her post after eight days after she sacked a number of high-ranking officials in the ministry. At the time, Nečas stated that his trust in Peake ‘had dropped to negative values’. Nečas took over the Ministry and last month, a new non-partisan minister was appointed, a decision about which Peake and/or LIDEM were not consulted. Remarkably, the man appointed as the new Defence minister was one of those that Peake had fired during her brief, eight-day tenure as Defence minister.

This is not the only example of LIDEM losing ministerial posts and receiving little or nothing in return. Earlier in December 2012, another LIDEM minister left (Pavel Dobeš) on his own accord after a conflict with his own party and Peake in particular. He was replaced by an ODS minister (Zbyněk Stanjura).

Political science theory about coalition formation and behavior relies fairly heavily on the assumption that influence on policy making (in the form of ministry posts) are the key chips that parties bargain with. In December 2012, LIDEM had a number of their chips taken away and seems to have gotten little in return. Their behavior might be explained by looking towards the future and to the polls, which predict the complete disappearance of LIDEM – but these same polls also predict (and have been predicting for a long time) that ODS (and to a lesser degree TOP 09) will suffer at the hands of the voters (Poll 1, Poll 2 (pdf)). LIDEM’s partners have just as much to lose from new elections, so it is not clear to me why PM Nečas has been able to treat LIDEM the way he has. Could it be that political science theory is wrong?

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* lidem is the unlikely dative plural of ‘člověk’, which means human or person, which makes lidem mean ‘for people, for a bunch of persons’; but it is also the instrumental singular of lid, which means ‘a people’ – so lidem can also mean ‘by the people’, where people refers to a political collective akin to nation (although Czech reserves národ for that, which shares the etymology of birth with nation). The Czech here shares an ambiguity with English in that it does not entirely differentiate between the plural people as a number of persons and people as a singular political unit similar to nation. Other languages use non-cognate terms to make this difference – cf German Mensch, Menschen for ‘person, people’ and Volk for ‘a people’, or French, les gens, le peuple. Both French and German also have die Nation/la nation in addition to das Volk/le peuple.

Street Photography

Street Photography

Some time ago I participated in a photographic workshop with renowned Czech photographer Jan Šibík. Šibík has worked in war-torn areas the world over and his work was recognized by World Press Photo in 2003. The workshop focused primarily on street photography, looking at the things people are doing in the public space. It made for an interesting experience as even in public, people feel they have a right to privacy and are not always keen on being photographed – understandably so. Overcoming the bashfulness and reluctance to jam a camera in someone’s face turned out to be quite the struggle. I’m still not sure that there is not something undignified about photographing people like that, especially when they’re in a vulnerable position, when they’re not necessarily happy about what they’re doing and/or doing what they’re doing voluntarily. It felt a little exploitative, although I’ll acknowledge I have a right as a (rank amateur) photographer to document what I see and experience in the public space.

I swear to uphold and protect …

I’m watching the inauguration of Miloš Zeman on-line (did not get invited – rude!). The ceremony is taking place in the gorgeous Vladislav Hall located in Prague Castle. As Zeman swore to be true to the Czech Republic over which he now presides, the runner-up Schwarzenberg (in his capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs) stood right behind him. Some genius thought it would be nice to park Schwarzenberg right behind Zeman taking the oath, which made for a striking contrast.

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CT24.cz – Zeman looks a bit bleary – I did not intend for this, it’s just how the screenshot came out. Schwarzenberg right behind him with the bow tie.

Not that Schwarzenberg came close – but if you just went by what you see here in Prague, you’d think the election had been stolen from him. Even now, over a month after the elections, the yellow-and-pink stickers, buttons, and posters with Schwarzenberg’s countenance are all over – only to be joined by new posters saying ‘Zeman is not my president’. I have seen no sign of any sort of support  for the President-Elect. For Schwarzenberg’s supporters, the defeat has been hard to swallow and the reaction has been a bit acrimonious.

In addition to Schwarzenberg and other members of the Czech government, both chambers of parliament were there, as well as a range of representatives of social and state organizations (army, church, etc.). Zeman’s wife, who keeps a notoriously low profile, was also there, as well as the second wife of former President Václav Havel’s second wife Dagmar. Of course, former president Klaus was also in attendance – his closing days in office were not what he had hoped for, as they were marked by the Senate indicting him with nothing less than high treason for his role in granting amnesty to a great many convicts including many people convicted for defrauding Czech taxpayers. This is an unprecedented move that could have lasting effects for future presidents (sure enough, new president Zeman has denounced the move as ‘hysterical’ and not because he thought it was very funny). We’ll have to see whether the Constitutional Court will consider the case – they have already denied that it lies within their jurisdiction to overrule the President’s amnesty and constitutional scholars are divided as to whether the treason case has merit.

Anyway, back to the inauguration. After the oath, Zeman ad-libbed a short speech. Characteristically, even in his inaugural speech, Zeman found a way to heap scorn on his nemesis, the Czech media. Listing those groups in society that he considers to be ‘islands of negative deviation’, he started out with the mafia and neo-nazi extremists, only to end with ‘parts of the media’, a group afflicted with minimal knowledge and maximum self-confidence. The crowd erupted into applause. I have a hard time imagining other heads of state using such strong language and being applauded for it.